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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW—LESSONS FROM 
RUSSIA 
PAUL B. STEPHAN, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This volume raises two broad and closely related questions. What do we mean 
when we talk about international human rights law? How should researchers 
investigate international human rights law? One is a matter of subject, the other 
of object. The papers in this symposium indicate multiple approaches to both. 
Rather than synthesizing these contributions or adjudicating among them, this 
intervention both embraces and challenges them. My main point is commonplace 
to the point of banality, that what you see depends on where you stand. The 
perspective I offer to make this point is Russian. 
Russia matters because the foundational moment for international human 
rights law—the lieu de mémoire of the field, with apologies to Pierre Nora—
occurred in the context of the U.S.-Soviet relationship through enactment of the 
human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.1 Russia later became a place 
for testing the claim that international human rights law has its greatest impact in 
the disassembly of authoritarian regimes. Finally, the work of economists who 
sought a rigorous explanation for their failures in Russia in the 1990s gave an 
enormous boost to the empirical turn in the study of the effect of legal institutions 
on societal outcomes—a close relative to the empirical study of the impact of 
international human rights law. A reconsideration of the Russian context thus 
brings to light ways to think about the origins of international human rights law, 
and what its consequences—more unintended than not—have been. 
The first part of this paper reviews the Russia experience, drawing 
shamelessly on my own adventures. Personal narrative presents challenges, not 
the least being the high likelihood that the audience does not find the author’s 
life as fascinating as he does. I will try to overcome these hurdles. The second 
part proposes ways of understanding this experience that can shape our approach 
to both the subject and object of international human rights law. I argue in 
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 1.  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 
[hereinafter The Final Act], reprinted in 73 Dep’t State Bull. 323 (1975); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST 
UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 148–55 (2010). 
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particular that local knowledge based on deep understanding of the society 
affected is indispensable to the human rights project, and that the specifics of 
local histories and values may defeat the expectations of the promoters of human 
rights. Although agnostic as to the future of this field, I hope to enrich the agenda 
of human rights workers and researchers going forward, whatever their 
methodological commitments. 
II 
RUSSIA AND THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
Specialists in international human rights law will find a focus on Russia odd, 
if not off-putting. Western human rights workers tended to see the Soviet Union 
as a negative space, embodying an antithesis of human rights. During the 
flowering of this field in the 1970s and 1980s, mainstream activists and academics 
typically sought to establish their anticommunist credentials as a predicate to 
launching critiques of what they framed as human rights abuses in the West.2 
Since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, they have paid little attention to Russia 
except as a somewhat backward place, a rival with Turkey for the greatest source 
of complaints brought to the European Court on Human Rights. They see Russia 
as peripheral, not central.3 
But Russia has been, and remains, more interesting than the mainstream view 
allows. The concept of international human rights law—human rights as a set of 
obligations resting on international law, not simply as an expression of values—
was forged in the postwar struggle for hegemony between the Soviet bloc, with 
Russia at its center, and the so-called capitalist world. The supposed triumph of 
the West in turn put the ideological claims to the test, as the struggle’s losers, first 
and foremost Russia, purported to assimilate the practice of human rights 
through international law enforcement. The many-sided disappointment of 
Western liberals with the results, especially in Yel´tsin’s Russia, energized a new 
body of empirical scholarship exploring the relationship between legal 
institutions and economic development. The empirical turn in international 
human rights scholarship is not exactly a direct offshoot of the legal-origins 
literature, but it bears a strong family resemblance. 
A. Helsinki and the Soviet-American Competition 
A turning point—Samuel Moyn has argued convincingly that it is the turning 
point—in the history of international human rights law was the Helsinki Final 
 
 2.  Moyn finds this anticommunist grounding in western human rights practice even earlier. Id. at 
44–45. 
 3.  Alternatively, they locate Russia as the home of a backlash against international human rights 
law. See Lauri Mälksoo, Introduction—Russia, Strasbourg, and the Paradox of a Human Rights Backlash, 
in RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE STRASBOURG EFFECT 3, 5 (Lauri 
Mälksoo & Wolfgang Benedek eds., 2018). 
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Act, signed in the summer of 1975.4 A legal formalist might find this observation 
surprising: By its terms, the Final Act was a political declaration, not a legal 
instrument. Its signatories proclaimed merely “their determination to act in 
accordance with the provisions contained in the above texts.”5 The principal 
purpose of the Final Act was to ratify the borders of postwar European states, in 
particular the western extension of the Soviet Union approved at Tehran and 
Yalta but thereafter deplored by the West.6  The human rights provisions, 
denominated as Basket III, became the price for Western accession to the Final 
Act. Stipulating that the Final Act was a political, but not legal, commitment 
allowed the Western states to give political comfort to the Soviet Union with 
respect to its borders without requiring these states to accord legal recognition to 
the absorption of the Baltic states or the revision of borders with Finland, 
Germany, Poland and Romania.7 Symmetrically, its political status meant that 
the Final Act imposed no new legal obligations regarding human rights on the 
Soviet Union or its satellites.8 
Yet, as Moyn demonstrates, this legal formalism proved no obstacle to a 
transformation in the prestige and practice of the field of international human 
rights law.9 Especially—but not only—in Central and Eastern Europe, activists 
elided the distinction between political and legal commitments to advance a new 
agenda of international human rights. The Carter Administration, which took 
office in 1977, elevated this movement to U.S. policy and further blurred the line 
between the political and the legal. What previously had been strands of thought 
in postwar Western liberalism became an international legal movement.10 
My involvement in these events was as a fly on the wall. In 1975, I worked as 
a specialist in Soviet politics in the Soviet Internal Branch of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Office of Current Intelligence. This Branch had functioned 
since the Agency’s founding as the home of the U.S. government’s close expert 
study of the Soviet Union’s internal dynamics.11 At that time, its leader and a 
plurality of its analysts had worked there since its creation. During the late spring 
and early summer of 1975, the Branch was asked to assess the likely domestic 
impact in the Soviet Union of the human rights provisions of the Final Act. 
I do not recall the specifics of the Central Intelligence Agency’s ultimate 
assessment of the Final Act. Like most official pronouncements, it was forged 
 
 4.  MOYN, supra note 1, at 148–49. 
 5.  The Final Act, supra note 1. The Final Act also stipulated that it was not eligible for registration 
with the United Nations pursuant to Article 102(1) of the UN Charter, further indicating that it lacked 
the status of a treaty under international law. See id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Japan was not a party to the Final Act, which therefore did not address the issue of the Soviet 
Union’s eastern borders.  
 8.  Id. § 1-a-VII. 
 9.  MOYN, supra note 1, at 122. 
 10.  Id. at 121. 
 11.  Sibling branches focused on Soviet foreign policy (Soviet External) and the Eastern bloc, 
making up a division within the Office. 
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through negotiations among the various clusters of experts (an internal 
interagency, if you will), with hard edges rounded off and strong claims muted. 
Given the preeminent position and, to put it gently, self-confidence of then-
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, one may doubt whether anything coming out 
of the Agency would have had much impact on the U.S. posture toward the Final 
Act. What I do recall, however, are the views of the Branch, delivered in oral 
form in the course of the interagency negotiations. 
The Branch, comprising the government’s best experts on Soviet politics, was 
deeply skeptical about the enterprise.12 It predicted that foisting on the Soviet 
regime a set of concepts for which they lacked an intellectual vocabulary would 
breed resentment and reaction. Internal critics of the regime—the dissidents—
would likely suffer, rather than be empowered, as the rulers sought to 
demonstrate that the new words do not mean any change in power relations. It 
was beyond the Branch’s remit to consider whether the human-rights concept 
might function as a wedge between the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern 
Europe. I do not recall whether the Branch predicted that the regime would 
create its own human rights vocabulary, establishing institutions to build 
counternarratives about international human rights law.13 The Branch was clear, 
however, as to the bottom line: Foisting human rights obligations on the Soviet 
Union would degrade the quality of dissident life in the short term and would 
probably accomplish nothing over the long term. 
I am not sure if I ever knew, and I certainly do not recall now, whether the 
Branch’s views were incorporated into the reports prepared at a higher level of 
the bureaucracy and ultimately delivered to the agency’s clients, namely the 
country’s political leadership. One might dismiss this episode as an example of 
the inherent conservatism of experts. People who have invested in the mastery of 
a complex system do not like to see their human capital depreciate. Yet the core 
insight of the Branch’s position deserves consideration. The experts believed that 
Soviet society as a whole lacked a way of understanding human rights in the forms 
propounded by the West. The few individuals in that society who embraced these 
concepts were radical exceptions, outliers who worked beyond the boundaries of 
acceptable public discourse.14 As the experts understood it, Soviet state structure 
 
 12.  When I say “best,” I mean people with both great experience and access to sources of 
information not widely available elsewhere (and in some instances not available at all), either within 
government or in the public domain. They still suffered from blind spots. In particular, they lacked access 
to knowledge gained by their political masters in the course of direct dealings with Soviet leaders. At the 
time, the Secretary of State conducted an especially personal form of diplomacy and held closely to his 
own impressions. My colleagues described briefing the Secretary to an oral defense of one’s graduate 
thesis, with the briefee assessing how well the briefer did in capturing what he already knew. 
 13.  Shortly after the signing of the Final Act, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Science’s Institute of State 
and Law created an international human rights section under the leadership of Viktor Mikhailovich 
Chchikvadze, a former head of the Institute famous for his conservatism. 
 14.  Cf. KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 
(1966). Soviet dissidents had begun to invoke the term “human rights” in the late 1960s as a means of 
capturing their comprehensive opposition to the Soviet status quo. In many cases they had learned the 
vocabulary from Western sources, to which they had intermittently privileged access. The Soviet 
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had not suppressed an inherent longing for western-style liberties in the Soviet 
population. Rather, it had succeeded in making these liberties incomprehensible 
for the vast majority of the population. 
Thanks to Helsinki, once the idea of international human rights came into 
play in the Soviet Union, it branched into two streams. The first involved the 
official public sector. There the idea functioned as an empty vessel into which 
approved thinkers could pour content that served the status quo. Individual 
freedom—according to the approved thinkers—meant belonging to a society that 
realized economic justice in the form of full employment, guaranteed housing, 
health care, and education, suppression of economic inequality, and repression 
of social relations that led to exploitation. Accordingly, speech or political action 
that frustrated the fulfillment of these goals as administered by the approved 
technical elite (as selected by the Party) represented attacks on human rights. 
The second stream involved everyone else in the Soviet Union. For the small 
and embattled sector that might be called civil society, human rights represented 
whatever existing Soviet reality was not. For the large disillusioned majority, both 
the official and unofficial sectors seemed beside the point. The Russian silent 
majority lacked the means to distinguish international human rights from other 
Western imports, such as Marxism-Leninism, that seemed to promise so much 
yet delivered so little. Exhausted and alienated, Russian society as a whole did 
not offer fertile soil for new idealisms rooted in Western rationalist traditions. 
B. International Human Rights Law And The Dismantling of The Soviet 
System 
Fast forward fifteen years. International human rights law had become a 
“thing.” Within the legal academic community, a cottage industry had emerged, 
replete with clinics, chairs, and NGOs devoted to publicizing, lobbying and 
litigating. Especially, but not only, in Central and Eastern Europe, the idea of 
human rights had become a node for opposition to Soviet domination. In the 
Western Hemisphere, a distinct human rights tradition served as a channel for 
organizing the surrender of authoritarian, mostly military regimes and the 
restoration of democratic, but not necessarily liberal, states. Human rights also 
became part of the vocabulary of opposition to the apartheid regime in South 
Africa, which was beginning to unravel in tandem with events in the Soviet 
Union. 
Human rights talk did crop up in the Soviet transition, which one might 
arbitrarily date from the 1986 adoption of perestroyka (reconstruction) as the 
official policy to the closing down of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991.15 The 
 
landscape, however, denied them a context for envisioning what implementing these ideas would look 
like in their lived world. Rather, the concept took on the character of a negative identity, meant to 
describe exactly what Soviet reality excluded. 
 15.  An alternate translation is “restructuring,” suggesting more of a corporate work-out and less of 
a society’s fundamental reform. I prefer the translation in text. I first wrote about the concept in Paul B. 
Stephan, Perestroyka i Sovetologiya [Perestroyka and Sovietology], 3 SSHA – EKONOMIKA POLITIKA 
IDEOLOGIYA [USA – ECON. POL. AND IDEOLOGY] 30 (1989) (journal of the Institute for United States 
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dominant discourse, however, differed significantly from that heard further west. 
The establishment reformers (Gorbachev and those who attached themselves to 
him) propounded the concepts of law-based state and universal values, rather 
than the particularities of human rights enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. 
Although some Western audiences mistook the aforementioned concept of law-
based state for the Anglo-American concept of “rule of law,” what the 
establishment reformers had in mind was the German rechsstaat, a commitment 
to transparency and stability rather than to the liberty of the subject.16 As for 
“universal values,” the reference to values rather than rights had the effect of 
separating reconstruction from international legal obligation. For radical 
reformers, many of whom aligned with Boris Yel´tsin and his team—in power as 
leaders of the Russian Federation from the middle of 1990—human rights again 
served as a means to distinguish their aspirations from the status quo but mostly 
lacked concrete programmatic content. What joined the radicals to Yel´tsin was 
a shared desire to be done with the Soviet Union, a goal accomplished sooner 
than anyone anticipated. 
Two private conversations with leading Russian legal figures at this time 
illuminate some of the peculiar roles of international human rights law in these 
events. The first conversation concerned the pronouncements of the U.S.S.R. 
Committee on Constitutional Supervision, the Soviet Union’s first stab at a 
constitutional court.17 Several of its initial cases addressed issues that came within 
the ambit of international human rights law. One considered the right of access 
to courts to review job dismissals, another the assignment of the burden of proof 
in criminal cases, and the third the publication of secret decrees governing 
individual rights and duties.18 In each instance, the Committee principally relied 
 
and Canada Studies of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences). An excellent overview of the period can be 
found in WILLIAM TAUBMAN, GORBACHEV: HIS LIFE AND TIMES (2017). 
 16.  See Paul B. Stephan, Further Thoughts on the Rule of Law and a New World Order, 26 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 739, 739 (1993) (explaining the distinction between the Soviet concept of law-based 
state and the Anglo-American concept of “rule of law”). 
 17.  Like the Appellate Committee of the British House of Lords (transformed into a Supreme Court 
only in 2009), the Committee on Constitutional Supervision was a component of the legislature and thus 
lacked the capacity to issue mandates on its own behalf. Whether it would have acquired a reputation for 
integrity and authority that would have obligated the legislature to automatically implement its 
judgments, as British tradition required with respect to the Appellate Committee, will never be known. 
See Herbert Hausmaninger, From the Soviet Committee on Constitutional Supervision to the Russian 
Constitutional Court, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 305 (1992). 
 18.  Zaklyucheniye Komiteta Konstitutsionnogo nadzora SSSR, 0 nesootvetstvii norm 
zakonodatel’stva, isklyuchayushchikh dlya ryada kategoriy rabotnikov sudebnyy proyadok 
rassmotreniya individual’nykh trudovykh sporov, polozhennyam Konstitutsii SSSR zakonov SSSR. 
mezhdunarodnykh aktov o pravakh cheloveka [Conclusion of the USSR Committee for Constitutional 
Supervision, on the insufficiency of legislative norms that exclude categories of workers from judicial 
review of individual labor disputes, based on the Constitution of the USSR, the laws of the USSR, and 
international acts on human rights], VEDOMOSTI S”EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I 
VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR [VED. SSSR] [Bulletin of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the 
USSR and Supreme Council of the USSR] 1990, No. 27, Item 524; Zaklyucheniye Komiteta 
Konstitutsionnogo nadzora SSSR, 0 nesootvetstvii norm ugolovnogo i ugolovno-protsessual’nogo 
zakonodatel’stva, opredelyayushchikh osnovaniya i poryadok osvobozhdeniya ot ugolovnoy 
otvetstvennosti s primeneniyem mer administrativnogo vzyskaniya ili obshchestvennogo vozdeystviya, 
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on international treaties as the basis for invalidating the domestic legislation at 
issue, although it also cited domestic constitutional provisions to complement the 
international rules. 
In early 1991, I met with Sergey Sergeyevich Alekseyev, the chair of the 
Committee, in Moscow. I asked him about his tribunal’s reliance on international 
human rights treaties as a means of invalidating domestic legislation, when the 
formal provisions of the U.S.S.R. Constitution might have provided a sufficient 
basis for these decisions. One-on-one he was disarmingly frank. “We cannot rely 
on our domestic law,” he explained, “because it has no legitimacy within our 
society. Only international law gives us hope that people will respect our 
decisions.”19 He seemed to believe that the function of judicial review, by which 
experts nullified acts of the legislature, required sources of legitimacy located 
abroad. At least at this critical juncture, norms did not migrate from international 
law, rather internationalism empowered specialists to enact outcomes that 
otherwise were beyond their reach. 
A second encounter occurred a year later, after the Russian Federation had 
superseded the Soviet Union. At a cocktail party I chatted up Vadim 
Konstantinovich Sobakin, a man I had first met when he served in a senior 
position in the Central Committee apparatus and then worked with when he 
became a member of the Committee on Constitutional Supervision. In 1992, he 
had migrated to the staff of the new Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation. The time was near the anniversary of the 1941 German invasion, 
perhaps the Soviet Union’s greatest trauma. As he was a veteran of that conflict, 
I asked him which was worse, then or now. He answered immediately and 
emphatically that now was worse. “Then we had an enemy.”20 
What I took Sobakin to mean is that the crisis that had overtaken and then 
ended the Soviet Union was deeply disturbing precisely because there was no 
external actor that could serve as a way of relieving Russians of the responsibility 
for their current confusion and disarray. Sobakin believed that the other nations 
of the former bloc had it easier, because they could blame the Russians for their 
troubles. But Russians had to look to themselves to understand how they had 
 
Konstitutsii SSSR i mezhdunarodnym aktam o pravakh cheloveka [Conclusion of the USSR Committee 
for Constitutional Supervision, on the insufficiency of norms of criminal and criminal-procedure 
legislation involving release from criminal responsibility conditioned on the application of measures of 
administrative punishment or social pressure, based on the USSR Constitution and international acts on 
human rights], VEDOMOSTI S”EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR 
[VED. SSSR] [Bulletin of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR and Supreme Council of the 
USSR] 1990, No. 39, Item 775; Zaklyucheniye Komiteta Konstitutsionnogo nadzora SSSR, 0 pravilakh, 
dopuskayushchikh primeneniye neopublikovannykh normativnykh aktov o pravakh, svobodakh i 
obyazannostyakh grazhdan [Conclusion of the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision, on rules 
for issuing unpublished normative acts with respect to the rights, freedoms and obligations of citizens], 
VEDOMOSTI S”EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR [VED. SSSR] 
[Bulletin of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR and Supreme Council of the USSR] 1990, 
No. 50, Item 1080. For my contemporaneous discussion of these decisions, see Paul B. Stephan, Revisiting 
the Incorporation Debate: The Role of Domestic Political Structure, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 417, 433–35 (1991).  
 19.  Of course, there is no transcript; this is the best that my memory offers.  
 20.  Again, fallible memory is my only source. 
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fallen, a much harder task. 
I regard these anecdotes as authentic, although certainly incomplete. Both 
men, as leading legal actors, managed to find important roles in the Yel´tsin 
regime, but they had made their careers under Soviet power. What these 
encounters reveal is part of the story of international human rights law and the 
reconstruction of a superpower. What the men expressed was an understanding 
of international human rights law as the face of the other. For Alekseyev, the 
content of international law did not matter so much as the fact that it was not 
domestic law, and therefore not associated with the discredited and disillusioning 
status quo. For Sobakin (and perhaps this is a stretch), it served as an anchor for 
opposing an adversary. Because Russia’s tragedy was internal, international 
human rights law did not help organize ways of thinking about the situation, 
much less mapping the way out. 
There were other voices in the legal community, including those that talked 
in ways that seemed congenial to the West. Invitations to travel to, and publish 
in, the West came readily to these people. In particular, Soviet specialists who 
were lucky enough to have a Baltic identity managed to migrate to, and then 
flourish in, societies that had closer ties with the West, including its human rights 
discourse. Within Russia, however, the ways of talking about human rights law 
that seemed so sensible in Europe proper remained largely peripheral, both 
politically and intellectually.21 
The grave diggers of the Soviet state did not completely ignore the concept 
of human rights. In the interval between the August 1991 failed coup that 
destroyed Gorbachev as a political force and the formal seizure of the main 
strands of Soviet power by the Russian Federation in December, the Russian 
legislature adopted a “Declaration of the Rights and Freedoms of Person and 
Citizen.”22 This declaration drew heavily on international law and stated in 
particular that “the generally recognized international norms concerning human 
rights” had priority over the content of domestic legislation.23 The 1993 
Constitution authorized a Commissioner for Human Rights who would serve as 
an ombudsman for enforcing the Declaration.24 Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights followed in 1998. But none of these measures can 
be linked to specific steps taken by or against the Russian state to change 
 
 21.  For an extension of this cultural incomprehension argument from human rights to property 
rights and other legal concepts associated with liberal markets, see URIEL PROCACCIA, RUSSIAN 
CULTURE, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE MARKET ECONOMY (2007). 
 22.  Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR o Deklaratsii prav i svobod cheloveka i grazhdanina 
[Resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on a Declaration of the Rights and Freedoms of Persons and 
Citizens], VEDOMOSTI S”EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV RSFSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR 
[VED. RSFSR] [Bulletin of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist 
Republic and Supreme Council of the RSFSR] 1991, Issue No. 52, Item 1865. See also Gennady M. 
Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 451, 461 (1994). Five 
month later, in April 1992, the extant constitution was amended to give the Declaration constitutional 
status. Id. 
 23.  VED. RSFSR, supra note 22.  
 24.  KONSTITUTSIA ROSSIIKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103(1)(f) (Russ.). 
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concrete aspects of social life. Rather, they served to dress up Russia, to declare 
and confirm a break with the past but not to establish a program for social or 
political change.25 
For someone steeped in Russian history, the flirtation with international 
human rights law in the 1990s seems another instance of the enduring tension in 
Russian culture between admiration of, and a desire to belong to, the West, and 
the Slavophile assertion of a unique national identity rooted in Byzantium and 
periodic triumphs over foreign invaders, whether Mongol, Lithuanian-Polish, 
French, or German. The nod toward international human rights law was a 
westernizing gesture. By the latter half of the 1990s, however, influential Russian 
specialists in international relations recast international human rights as an 
example of Western animus toward Russian ideals. For these critics, international 
human rights law was simply another club wielded by the West to thwart Russia’s 
realization of its unique historical destiny.26 
C. The Blunders of Shock Therapy And Empirical Research Into Legal 
Institutions 
The latter-day Slavophiles returned to prominence in the 1990s largely 
because the Western-backed restructuring of the Russian economic system had 
become, in popular perception at least, a disaster. The so-called Washington 
consensus, at the time simply the popular wisdom but today considered the 
neoliberal fallacy, prescribed rapid privatization as the precondition to the 
creation of markets.27 As a contract consultant to the U.S. Treasury, the OECD, 
the IMF and the World Bank, I spent these years bumping heads with the 
Western specialists (economists, accountants, and lawyers) who implemented the 
shock therapy program, the dismantling of Soviet-era economic institutions in 
advance of the creation of public and private institutions that a liberal economic 
 
 25.  The closest thing to a concrete change in social practice associated with international human 
rights law was the abandonment (but not the abolition) of the death penalty. Russia signed but did not 
ratify Protocol 6 of the European Convention and hence had no binding international legal obligation to 
stop executing people. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation nevertheless referred to 
Protocol 6 in the course of interpreting domestic law as barring future use of capital punishment. 
Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Doing Away with Capital Punishment in Russia: International Law and the 
Pursuit of Domestic Constitutional Goals, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (Anthea 
Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, eds., 2018). 
 26.  See e.g., Sergey Vladimirovich Kortunov, Kholodnaya Voyna: Paradoksy Odnoy Strategii [The 
Cold War: The Paradoxes of One Strategy], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’ 23 (No. 5, 1998), translated in Is 
the Cold War Really Over? 44 INT’L. AFF. 142 (No. 5, 1998). I discussed the significance of Kortunov’s 
views (he was one of Yel´tsin’s senior advisors) in Paul B. Stephan, The Cold War and Soviet Law, 93 
AM. SOC’Y. INT’L L. PROC. 43, 50 (1999). I returned to this topic, and pointed out Kortunov’s affinity 
with President Putin, in Paul B. Stephan, The Impact of the Cold War on Soviet and US Law: 
Reconsidering the Legacy, in THE LEGAL DIMENSION IN COLD WAR INTERACTIONS: SOME NOTES 
FROM THE FIELD 141, 156 (Tatiana Borisova & William B. Simons eds., 2012). For a more recent framing 
of Russian attitudes toward international human rights in terms of the westernizing-Slavophile dyad, see 
Mikhail Antonov, Philosophy Behind Human Rights: Valery Zorkin v. the West?, in RUSSIA AND THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE STRASBOURG EFFECT, supra note 3, at 150. 
 27.  For more on this, see Umut Özsu, Neoliberalism and Human Rights: The Brandt Commission 
and the Struggle for a New World, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 4, 2018, at 139  (2018). 
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system needs to function. Many of these figures seemed to assume that those 
institutions would arise spontaneously, as if private property and free markets 
represented a state of nature rather than a particular cultural and historical 
artifact. 
Most Russians then and since saw the 1990s as a time of troubles (Smutnoye 
Vremya), a term with deep historical resonance.28 The term refers specifically to 
the collapse of the Muscovite state in the early seventeenth century and the 
occupation of its territory by the Lithuanian-Polish kingdom.  That Russians 
compared the social and economic disruption and omnipresent Western presence 
in the 1990s to Russia’s historical nadir and national humiliation indicates how 
badly the reforms went. Life expectancy dropped alarmingly and social inequality 
exploded. Many Russians perceived the improbable re-election of Yel´tsin as 
President in 1996 as evidence of corruption of the electoral process funded in part 
by the West, rather than as a legitimate expression of the popular will. The civil 
war in Chechnya, with terrorist consequences for Moscow and other heartland 
Russian cities, added another level of torment and dismay. 
One of the principal architects of the shock therapy program was Andrei 
Shleifer, a rising star on the Harvard economics faculty. Shleifer worked in Russia 
through the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) and was 
funded through U.S. AID, then an independent agency of the U.S. government. 
That something was wrong with the shock therapy project must have been clear 
to Shleifer by 1997, when U.S. AID shut down the HIID program in Russia 
because of alleged misconduct by him and his principal aide, Jonathan Hay.29 In 
1998, Shleifer published the first of the pathbreaking papers on legal origins, an 
econometric inquiry into the effect of legal institutions on economic 
development.30 These papers transformed the study of the behavioral 
consequences of law. As Samuel Moyn indicates in his paper, the legal origins 
literature frames, even if it did not directly bring about, the quantitative analysis 
of international human rights law that appeared at the beginning of this century 
and that several of the papers in this symposium explore.31 
I can only speculate on what led to this shift in Shleifer’s research. It seems 
plausible, however, that the principal premise of shock therapy—that legal 
 
 28.  See ALLEN C. LYNCH, HOW RUSSIA IS NOT RULED   REFLECTIONS ON RUSSIAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 85–127 (2005). 
 29.  These events imperiled a program I had put together to bring Russian judges to the United 
States. HIID had agreed to fund the trip before the ax fell on its Russian work. At the last minute U.S. 
AID agreed to release money for my event, allowing several members of the High Arbitrazh Court to 
spend a week at the U.S. Tax Court. The U.S. government initially brought criminal charges against 
Shleifer and Hay, accusing them of abusing their positions in the federally funded program for private 
gain. It then dropped those charges but obtained a substantial civil settlement from Shleifer, Hay, and 
Harvard. JANINE R. WEDEL, SHADOW ELITE: HOW THE WORLD’S NEW POWER BROKERS 
UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY, GOVERNMENT AND THE FREE MARKET 144 (2009). 
 30.  See Rafeal LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and 
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON., no. 6, Dec. 1998, at 1113. 
 31.  See Samuel Moyn, Beyond the Human Rights Measurement Controversy, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. No. 4, 2018, at 121. 
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structures necessary for the functioning of a liberal society will emerge 
spontaneously in response to privatization of state assets—was seriously 
incomplete, and that this deficiency had become clear to him. I imagine him 
coming out of the Russian experience recognizing that institutions could not be 
assumed, but rather rested on specific conditions that required intense empirical 
study to be understood, much less created. In other words, I believe, although I 
cannot prove, that Russia gave the impetus for an intellectual inquiry that led the 
way to the quantitative analysis of international human rights law, just as it 
provided the lieu de mémoire for the field itself. 
After the 1990s, Russia enjoyed, if not a Thermidor, at least a restoration. 
Vladimir Putin, as President and, intermittently, Prime Minister, emerged as a 
strong leader in place of the exhausted, decrepit Yel´tsin. An oil price boom, 
coupled with brutal but definitive resolution of the Chechnya conflict and 
political stability based on recentralization of power in the Kremlin, brought 
Putin to new heights of domestic popularity.32 Without expressly disavowing 
international human rights law, the Russian state increasingly distanced itself 
from the concept. A defining moment came when the European Court on Human 
Rights determined that Russia’s nationalization of Yukos, what had been the 
country’s largest energy company, transgressed the European Convention.33 In 
response to what was the largest judgment in the European Court’s history in 
favor of a human rights victim, the Russian Federation empowered the 
Constitutional Court to review such judgments for their constitutional validity. 
The Constitutional Court obligingly ruled that Russia was constitutionally barred 
from honoring the European Court’s judgment in this case.34 Without denouncing 
the Convention, Russia has effectively disavowed its obligations under it.35 
  
 
 32.  ALLEN C. LYNCH, VLADIMIR PUTIN AND RUSSIAN STATECRAFT 53–64 (2011). 
 33.  OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011). 
Whenever I discuss that dispute, I am constrained to disclose that I have participated in multiple 
proceedings as an expert witness on behalf of Yukos and its investors, although I did not take part in the 
case before the European Court. One should discount my views accordingly. See Paul B. Stephan, 
Taxation and Expropriation—The Destruction of the Yukos Oil Empire, 35 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 1 (2013). 
 34.  Konstitutsionnyy sud Rossiyskoy Federatsii Postanovlenie ot 19 yanvarya 2017 g. N. 1-P 
[Resolution No. 1-P of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of January 19, 2017], 
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federal Collection of 
Legislation] 2017, No. 1-P, 180, http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/ 
2017_January_19_1-P.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7HX-4H5Q] (official English translation). 
 35.  The judgment provoked Bill Bowring, otherwise a vigorous defender of Russia’s engagement 
with European Convention and the Strasbourg Court, to admit that “it may be that the recent Yukos 
judgment of the Russian CC provokes a final rupture in relations between Russia and the [Council of 
Europe].” Bill Bowring, Russia’s Cases in the ECtHR and the Question of Implementation, in RUSSIA 
AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE STRASBOURG EFFECT, supra note 3, at 188, 221. 
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III 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN LIGHT OF THE RUSSIAN 
EXPERIENCE 
This episodic account of Russian encounters with international human rights 
law has four purposes. First, it illustrates the importance of case studies that draw 
on intensive local knowledge. Second, it supports a characterization of 
international human rights law as both geographically and temporally contingent. 
Third, and in connection with the second purpose, it indicates ways in which 
international human rights law can be used instrumentally for purposes other 
than the advancement of human dignity. Fourth, it suggests some challenges to 
quantitative analysis of national practice with respect to international human 
rights law. 
A. The Importance of Local Knowledge 
One of the collateral effects of the end of the Cold War was the sudden 
unfashionability of area studies as an academic approach to international 
relations. This has not been a complete loss:  Area-studies experts suffered from 
insularity and too often resisted making connections between what they knew 
well and broader social issues. But the bundling of historical, cultural, and 
political knowledge that the best area-studies people deployed could deliver 
insights that other methodologies could not. There may be such a thing as too 
much context. But the use of resonance as a means of making sense out of 
discrete observations gave us something that fancy theory and quantitative 
analysis do not. 
I do not mean to disparage either theory or empirical work. Scholarship 
without theory is journalism, an unreflective and uncritical account that engages 
neither other scholars nor the world at large. Empirical work makes it possible to 
challenge and revise theory. My concern is that the turn against area studies in 
the early 1990s in the United States, if not elsewhere in the academy, abandoned 
an essential element of empirical work and foreclosed a particularly important 
theoretical move—local variation. 
At its best, deep local knowledge complements and extends what we can get 
from fancy theory and quantitative analysis. It brings authenticity and additional 
possibilities for falsification of theory-driven claims. It can also guide quantitative 
inquiries, as I discuss below. Deep local knowledge is, in sum, a useful and 
perhaps indispensable means for studying any significant social phenomenon, the 
societal effects of international human rights law included. 
B. The Contingency of International Human Rights Law 
The Russian story serves another purpose. It represents one piece of evidence 
undermining the more grandiose claims for international human rights law. It 
indicates that international human rights law does not represent a widely 
accepted consensus on fundamental principles about good societies. Rather, at 
least for Russia, what gets put into the international human rights basket depends 
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a great deal on the place and time. 
This finding opens the door for further references to local knowledge: What 
about China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, Indonesia, and Malaysia (just to 
focus on large countries outside the traditional West)? How thin is the cloak of 
words ascribing human rights law, and how thick are the local interpretations and 
implicit understandings of these words? What changes over time, and in what 
direction? Is the conception of international human rights law as universal 
norms—widely understood if not necessarily widely honored—misleading, 
perhaps even a mystification? 
As someone who has spent too much time in Russia, both physically and 
intellectually, the idea that international law often, and perhaps largely, 
represents local claims rather than universal norms comes naturally to me. Long 
before the human rights moment of the 1970s, Soviet and U.S. specialists 
advanced fundamentally different visions of what constitutes international law 
and what results from the existence of an international legal obligation.36 The 
collapse of the Soviet Union led some triumphalists to assert that a new era of 
universal liberal values, largely inscribed in international law, had emerged. A 
quarter century on, liberal internationalism seems a passing impulse, no longer 
dominant even in the western capitals (first and foremost Washington) where it 
originated. 
Reflecting these changes, a new field has emerged, comparative international 
law, that explores the foundations of variation in claims about international law 
among states and regions. Research has uncovered both systematic differences in 
the claims and striking contrasts in the cultures and training of international 
lawyers.37 Much work remains, but it seems clear that both structural state 
incentives of the sort that rational-interest international-relations scholars 
investigate and cultural structures of the sort that constructivists explore have 
much to do with what passes for international-law claims in various parts of the 
world. 
This general phenomenon has particular significance for international human 
rights law. Much of the normative pull of this body of norms rests on its 
aspirations to universality. The claim that these rights derive ultimately from 
natural law or deep moral commitments seems hollow if what we observe in the 
world is not simply a dispersion of legal rights but systematic differences in how 
states not only apply, but conceive of these institutions. The Russian story fits 
into a larger narrative that unmasks universality as pretentious, and perhaps 
hegemonic. 
As I have argued elsewhere, proponents of international human rights law 
 
 36.  See e.g., Leon Lipson, Peaceful Coexistence, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 4, 1964, at 871; 
Leon Lipson, The Rise and Fall of “Peaceful Coexistence” in International Law, in PAPERS ON SOVIET 
LAW 6 (Leon Lipson & Valery Chalidze eds., 1977). 
 37.  COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25; ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL 
LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017); Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila 
Versteeg, Exploring Comparative International Law, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 467 (2015). 
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need not be dismayed by this news.38 Divergence in the content and conception 
of this body of law indicates its importance, not its irrelevance. If international 
human rights law had no bite, states would have no difficulty embracing it and 
would have no need to adapt it to local conditions. That adaptation occurs 
suggests that states take the law seriously.39 
This argument, however, is inferential rather than empirical. It may be that 
states, even as they adapt, also circumvent or ignore these obligations. The results 
of comparative international law, to which my Russian story adds an exclamation 
point, underline the importance of serious study of how international human 
rights law manifests itself in different societies. 
C. Instrumental Uses of International Human Rights Law 
The Russian story suggests another side to advocacy of international human 
rights. Between 1990 and 1993, a fierce political struggle unfolded over control of 
the state and its resources. The first stage involved a contest between those 
wielding authority under the auspices of the U.S.S.R. (led by Gorbachev) and 
those associated with the reconstructed R.S.F.S.R. (led by Yel´tsin). This contest 
ended in December 1991 with a deal under which Yel´tsin relinquished claims to 
the non-Russian part of the U.S.S.R. in return for the agreement of ten other 
components of the Soviet state to leave the Union and thus surrender their claims 
on Russia (four other Republics already having declared their independence). 
The second stage fit into a long tradition in Russian history, as the prevailing 
group in Russia fought amongst itself for suzerainty over what it had wrested 
away from the U.S.S.R. The conflict reached its climax in October 1993, when 
the presidential administration carried out an armed attack on the parliament 
that resulted in hundreds of deaths and the political (but not physical) liquidation 
of Yel´tsin’s adversaries.40 
International human rights law did not play a major role in these battles, but 
it did appear on the periphery. As noted above, in the first stage the U.S.S.R. 
Committee on Constitutional Supervision, on the one hand, and the Russian 
legislature, on the other, signaled their loyalty to the idea of international human 
rights law. These signals were more conceptual than programmatic.  They 
reflected an intuition that embracing an “other,” however incompletely 
understood and however undefined the embrace, would work better than using 
illegitimate domestic practice to make particular reform programs more 
 
 38.  Paul B. Stephan, Comparative International Law, Foreign Relations Law and Fragmentation: 
Can the Center Hold?, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 53. 
 39.  Id. at 67.  
 40.  Narratives about the 1993 uprising vary radically. For the United States, it represented a 
commendable suppression of reactionary forces by well-intended reformers in tune with U.S. policy. A 
more critical view is expressed in LYNCH, supra note 28, at 136 (“[T]he distinguishing mark of Yel´tsin’s 
presidency is his use of Russian tanks in October 1993 to destroy the Russian parliament, thereby 
resolving Russia’s most important dispute over policy and the nature of the regime by the bullet rather 
than the ballot. Russia’s authoritarian constitution, which vests highly concentrated powers in the hands 
of the (elected) executive, is a direct consequence of that failure of policy.”). 
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attractive. The question became which side could more credibly claim to have 
broken with the past, with a supposed submission to international human rights 
law serving as an indicator of the break. 
The second stage of the struggle put these claims in a new and darker context. 
One dimension of the conflict between Yel´tsin and his opponents was the rule 
of law, an idea laced with human-rights implications. The Soviet legacy was one 
of arbitrary fiat, of legality serving to dress up assertions of power. The new 
regime promised that it would adhere to a Western notion of law-based 
governance. The problem, however, was that the extant Russian Constitution, 
although amended many times since 1990, still subordinated presidential 
authority to parliamentary control. The Constitutional Court, which was 
supposed to embody this new approach to legality, sided repeatedly with the 
parliament in opposing presidential seizures of power. In response, Yel´tsin shut 
down the Court just as he sent in the tanks to oust the parliament. He allowed 
the Court to reopen only in 1995, with a new chair and now suitably chastened. 
Twenty-two years on and counting, the Court has yet to pose a serious barrier to 
actions that the executive has indicated to be important.41 
Perhaps one need say nothing more about this episode than that transplanting 
of international human rights law into Russia in the early 1990s was sincere but 
incomplete. Yet it has an air of bait-and-switch, of opportunistic invocation of 
abstract foreign ideals as a way of smoothing a regime change. Although only a 
datum, it is consistent with the feint hypothesis about international human rights 
law, namely that states may undertake human rights obligations to deflect outside 
scrutiny of their authoritarian practice.42 
This raises the possibility that international human rights law might, in 
particular contexts, have perverse effects and that state actors could use them for 
their own purposes. The task of the scholar becomes connecting the misdirection 
to the intended effect. Establishing intentionality can be difficult, even with thick 
description. Quantitative analysis also poses difficulties, given the significant gap 
between correlation and causation. Work that focuses on talk to the exclusion of 
behavior confronts especially great challenges.43 
Perhaps one can dismiss the Russian story as an outlier. States that act in bad 
faith may be rare and uninteresting. Perhaps such conduct gets caught sufficiently 
often to make the payoff of its discovery too slight, in light of the damage that 
 
 41.  In one of the paradoxes of history, Valeriy Dmitriyevich Zor’kin, the Constitutional Court chair 
whose ouster Yel´tsin procured in 1995, was restored to the chair under Putin and has become an 
articulate proponent of the idea that Russian legal thought represents national exceptionalism to which 
Western legal thinking is inimical. Antonov, supra note 26, at 155–59. 
 42.  See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002). 
As Moyn notes, this is a leading article in the field of quantitative analysis of human rights practice. Moyn, 
supra note 31, at 3. 
 43.  See e.g., Hyeran Jo & John Niehaus, Through Rebel Eyes   Rebel Groups, Human Rights, and 
Humanitarian Law, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 4, 2018, at 101. To be clear, establishing what 
significant actors say is an essential part of any study of legal institutions. But without some way of linking 
expressions to actions, one can miss a great deal. 
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the bad-faith narrative does to the project as a whole. Yet this loose end remains 
troubling, especially if one entertains the possibility that conventional human 
rights claims serve largely as distractions from more fundamental questions of 
social and economic justice. 
D. Challenges for the Quants 
Like any methodology, empirical work can have its shortcomings. Its 
practitioners can fall in love with deep dives into rich data sets and lose track of 
the reasons for interrogating the data. They can let the ease of coding drive their 
agenda, thereby neglecting critical but difficult-to-measure phenomena. They 
may focus on irrelevant results simply because they are obtainable. Yet for all 
this, quantitative tools, used wisely, can unlock secrets and upend our beliefs 
about social life. 
The arguments for quantitative analysis fall into two categories. First, there is 
the compared-to-what point. Nonquantitative analysis has its own problems. 
Scholarship is, in essence, a way of talking, and talk about talk seems to me 
unsatisfyingly circular. This is what academics do when they write about each 
other. War, misery, and indignity deserve more.44 The practice of war and 
degradation, and not how we talk about it, merits our attention.45 
Second, quantitative empirical work at its best is democratic and egalitarian 
in a way that talk scholarship is not. To be sure, there can be biases in what one 
chooses to observe and how one defines an observation. But once one lays out 
one’s approach, others can test it for replication.46 There is something satisfying 
in imposing this discipline on even the most exalted and honored of scholars. 
As well as democratic, empirical work can also be egalitarian. Studying talk 
necessarily favors the articulate and arresting; observations, by contrast, can 
focus on the mundane but meaningful. There is no question that quantitative 
empirical work can hide behind equations and numbers as a means of 
intimidating critical responses. The garbage-in-garbage-out risk is ever present. 
But, if done with care and imagination, it can expose the lives and concerns of 
 
 44.  I am unclear, for example, as to the constitution of the dependent variable in Cosette D. 
Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, A History of Self-Reporting: The Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s 
Rights, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 4, 2018, at 31. Is the point that periodic reporting leads to better 
reporting, or that better reporting translates into an increase in enforcement resources and better life 
opportunities for women? How are better life opportunities measured, and how does one segregate the 
effects of reporting from other variables such as income growth, restructuring of the labor market, 
educational opportunities, etc.? Better reporting alone is simply talk; life outcomes are, I would have 
thought, what we want to measure. Perhaps the data sets they use get at this, but a reader, at least, goes 
away uncertain. 
 45.  Thus, as much as I admire Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, I regret the arc traced from 
Hathaway, supra note 42, to OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: 
HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW THE WORLD (2017). The first work, however controversial, made 
a stab at getting past talk to identify the revealed preferences of particular regimes. The new book, by 
contrast, equates talk about remaking the world with remaking the world itself. No doubt both projects 
are contributions, but the former seems to me invaluable in a way that the latter is not. 
 46.  Barbara A. Spellman, Science in Spite of Itself, 544 NATURE 414 (2017).  
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those that, exactly because they are inarticulate, drop out of talk scholarship. 
That said, the Russian story remains a cautionary tale for those seeking to 
apply quantitative analysis to law, especially international human rights law. How 
does one code for the chasm between formal commitments (constitutional 
commitment to international human rights law as a source of higher-order, 
judicially enforceable norms) and the institutional enforcement structure 
(housebroken judiciary, including the Constitutional Court)? Does resistance to 
Western conceptions of human rights norms count as a violation, or instead 
expose the complexity and indeterminacy of the international regime?47 In the 
field of human rights, is Russia a scofflaw or a norm entrepreneur? 
These questions suggest at least two challenges for quantitative empirical 
analysis. First are coding issues that arise when official actors adopt a Potemkin-
village response to legal obligations. Astute observers may be able to swap out 
action (what lurks behind the façade) for talk (the façade), but knowing when 
and how to do so requires considerable local knowledge. Second, and even more 
problematic, is the possibility that local conditions so completely dominate a 
country’s outcomes as to make comparative analysis irrelevant. Local knowledge 
might lead us to conclude that observations made at a particular time and place 
represent outliers that do not belong in a respectable data set. 
None of these points should be seen as rejecting quantitative empirical work 
as such. To say that it can be hard to do this kind of research well is not to say 
that it should not be done. At the end of the day, much good can come out of 
assembling well-conceived data sets and then addressing them with smart 
questions. It all depends on what we consider well-conceived and smart. 
This provokes a final point. There is an argument, in this symposium most 
clearly stated by Samuel Moyn, that quantitative empirical work can distract the 
researcher from the really important questions.48 The satisfaction gained from 
elegant exploration of the world as we find it may substitute for thinking about 
what a good society should look like. We must be clear about the preconditions 
and constitution of justice, the argument goes, before we consider whether the 
marginal effects of our legal instruments make the world a better place. Studying 
these effects, in the absence of an inspiring vision of the good, becomes a waste 
of valuable intellectual energy. 
I take Moyn’s argument as more about the political economy of the academy 
in rich countries than a categorical claim about the pursuit of knowledge as such. 
Justice-imaginers and bean-counters compete for scarce academic resources. 
Academic bureaucrats may be lulled into a false comparison of quantitative 
empirical social science work with the more prestigious accomplishments of hard 
science. These bureaucrats also may resist supporting really challenging inquiries 
into the fundamentals of justice, as that work raises uncomfortable questions 
about the status quo that entrenched academics prefer to ignore. 
 
 47.  Cf. Kevin L. Cope, Charles Crabtree & Christopher J. Fariss, Conceptualizing Repression, 81 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 4, 2018, at 185. 
 48.  Moyn, supra note 31, at 3. 
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I have no doubt this is true. But I wonder to what extent the rich world’s 
academies are the right place to look for transformative visions and compelling 
new politics. For those of us who work in the Russian tradition and the upending 
of social relations and the creation of a new kind of politics that have occurred 
there, the contribution of university professors seems sparse indeed.49 Herzen, 
Marx, Engels, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, as well as Plekhanov, Zasulich, Martov, 
Trotsky and Lenin, did journalism and published articles and books, but to my 
knowledge none ever held an academic position. They were members of the 
intelligentsia, but not of academia. 
Of course, it very well may be that this observation demonstrates a poverty 
of imagination about the academia. Whatever the role of the academy in the late 
nineteenth century West, the contemporary university serves as a pillar of the 
information economy. Exactly because of the academy’s importance in serving 
the status quo, it has the capacity to challenge and even transform the knowledge-
based global society. Yet I wonder. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
As to how the academy should proceed in the study of international human 
rights, I am agnostic. Perhaps the future of international human rights law is to 
open up new visions of a just and human global order, to transcend both talk-
about-talk and bean-counting and to provoke concrete action across many 
dimensions. Perhaps academic researchers will play a leading, or at least helpful, 
role in all this. It remains my conviction, however, that local knowledge will be 
indispensable to this enterprise. By this I do not mean that it won’t be dispensed 
with, but rather that without confronting, embracing, and extending local 
knowledge the enterprise is not likely to end well. 
 
 
 49.  See generally YURI SLEZKINE, THE HOUSE OF GOVERNMENT (2018) (documenting the 
transformation and the transformers). 
